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Note
Who Your Friends Are Could Get You Fired! The
Connick "Public Concern" Test Unjustifiably
Restricts Public Employees' Associational
Rights
Paul Cerkvenik
There are no countries in which associations are more needed, to pre-
vent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prince, than
those which are democratically constituted.
Alexis de Tocqueville, 18351
The Columbus, Mississippi, Fire Department hired William
Boddie in 1987, under terms of employment that included a
twelve-month probationary period.2 Boddie was not an officer or
even a member of the local firefighters' union, but was friends
with some local union officials.3 Just eight hours before the end
of his probationary period, the city, through its fire chief, Robert
W. Gale, fired Boddie.4 Alleging that the dismissal violated his
First Amendment right to freedom of association, Boddie
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the city and Gale.5 At
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98 (Richard D. Heff-
ner ed., 1956) (1835).
2. Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1993).
3. Id. at 751.
4. Id. at 747.
5. Id. at 746-47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Courts analyze § 1983 claims under a three-step process. First, the plain-
tiff must show that the alleged conduct was constitutionally protected. Second,
the plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a substantial factor or a
motivating factor in the job discipline or dismissal action. Third, the defendant
may show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the
same decision or taken the same action even in the absence of the protected
conduct. Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). This
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trial, the defendants asserted that they fired Boddie because of
his "poor attitude."6 The jury found the defendant's assertion to
be mere pretext and concluded Boddie's discharge violated his
First Amendment rights because the city fired him for associat-
ing with officers in the local firefighter's union.
7
The key issue before the Fifth Circuit on appeal was
whether the "public concern" requirement for speech-based
claims outlined in Connick v. Myers8 applies to association-
based First Amendment claims as well.9 The defendants argued
that because Boddie failed to prove that his association with
union members was a "matter of public concern," his associa-
tional activity fell outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment, under the test set forth in Connick.10 Applying Fifth
Circuit precedents, 1' the Boddie court held that proof of consti-
tutionally protected associational activity did not require an "in-
dependent proof that [the association] touched a matter of public
concern" to establish a prima facie case under § 1983.12 In af-
firming the trial court decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Note addresses only the first element of a § 1983 claim-whether the activity in
question is protected conduct.
6. Boddie, 989 F.2d at 747.
7. Id. The question put to the jury was whether "Mr. Boddie's exercise of
his protected First Amendment right of association was a substantial or moti-
vating factors [sic] in the decision by the City and Chief Gale to discharge him."
Id. at 751. At trial one city councilperson testified that Chief Gale told him that
Boddie "hung out with the wrong crowd," which the councilor believed was a
reference to the union. Id. Chief Gale himself testified that any union causes
"turmoil," and union members testified that they "advised firemen not to join
the union during their probationary period for fear of retaliation." Id.
8. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick was a § 1983 case involving a claim of
discharge of a public employee in violation of the employee's First Amendment
freedom of speech rights. Id. In Connick, the Supreme Court held that gener-
ally a public employee's speech must "touch upon a matter of public concern" to
be constitutionally protected. Id. at 147; see also infra notes 52-58 and accom-
panying text (detailing the Court's holding in Connick).
9. Boddie, 989 F.2d at 747.
10. Id. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (detailing the Court's
holding in Connick).
11. The Boddie court cited Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir.
1991); Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 992-93 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2275 (1992); and Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. &
Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1987). Boddie, 989 F.2d at 747.
In Coughlin, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a] public employee's claim that he
has been discharged for his political affiliation in violation of his right to freely
associate is not subject to the threshold public concern requirement." Coughlin,
946 F.2d at 1158.
12. Boddie, 989 F.2d at 747.
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Connick test applied only to speech and not to associational
activity.13
The Boddie case exemplifies the problem that has created a
split in the federal circuit courts: does Connick's threshold "pub-
lic concern" requirement apply only to speech-based claims, or
does it also apply to freedom of association claims?' 4 Not all
courts have agreed with the Boddie court's reasoning on this is-
sue, and even the Boddie court indicated its discomfort with the
conclusion it reached. 15 Courts that face this issue must ad-
dress a fundamental underlying question: to what extent will
courts protect freedom of association for public employees? The
issue is significant because public sector employees comprise
over seventeen percent of today's civilian workforce,' 6 and be-
cause the increasing diversity of American society has led to a
vast expansion of new kinds of associations among individuals.
A uniform determination of this issue will resolve a split among
the federal circuit courts, and more importantly, could shape
and clarify the parameters of the right of freedom of association
for all citizens.
This Note analyzes the division in the federal circuit courts
over whether the Connick "public concern" test should apply to
public employees' claims of discharge in violation of protected
First Amendment associational activity. Part I describes free-
dom of association jurisprudence under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Part I also details public employees'
associational and speech rights as defined under the original
balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Education,'7 and under
13. Id.
14. The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the Connick
public concern test does not apply in associational cases; the Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits hold that Connick does apply. See infra note 59 (summarizing
cases on each side of the issue).
15. The result the Boddie court reached was not as certain as the brevity of
the opinion implies. In rejecting the applicability of the Connick public concern
test to association, the Boddie court said of the defendant's argument, "lilts
force aside, the answer to this question is not open for this panel." Boddie, 989
F.2d at 747 (emphasis added). The clear implication of the opinion's language
is that, despite the court's broad view of the scope of constitutionally protected
associational activity, it would apply Connick to bar Boddie's claim if it were not
bound by Fifth Circuit precedent.
16. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993, at 419-21 (113th ed. 1993). In 1992,
there were 18,579,000 federal, state, and local government employees in a total
civilian workforce of just over 108 million persons. Id.
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's reasoning and holding in Pickering).
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the newer "public concern" test established in Connick v. My-
ers.'8 Part I concludes by summarizing the current circuit court
split and explaining that Supreme Court precedents neither
mandate nor prohibit application of the Connick public concern
test to associational claims. Part II contends that the funda-
mental differences in origin and nature between speech rights
and associational rights should preclude applying the Connick
public concern test in associational rights cases. Part II also ar-
gues that the Connick public concern test unjustifiably restricts
the associational rights of public employees. Finally, Part III
suggests that the proper approach for resolving the controver-
sies raised by the assertion of associational rights in the public
employment context ought to involve application of the balanc-
ing test set forth in Pickering, after a determination of the de-
gree of constitutional protection the association deserves.
I. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
A. THE IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The United States Constitution does not expressly protect
the freedom to associate. 19 The language and history of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, imply the protec-
tion of this right.20 Three general categories constitute the right
18. 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Courts reasoning and holding in Connick).
19. Freedom of association means "the right of all persons to associate to-
gether in groups to further their lawful interests." Professional Ass'n of College
Educators v. El Paso County Community College, 730 F.2d. 258, 262 (5th Cir.)
(citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (recognizing that free-
dom of association includes the right not to associate)), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
881 (1984); see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 5
(1964) ("[I]t cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guaran-
tees... give railroad workers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose
of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave
them."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (recog-
nizing the right of persons to "pursue their lawful private interests privately
and to associate freely with others in so doing").
20. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-1, at 785,
§ 12-26, at 1010 (1988).
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech; or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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to freedom of association:21 expressive association connected to
First Amendment rights of speech, religion, or assembly;22 asso-
ciation connected with the privacy right derived from the liberty
concepts of the Due Process Clauses; 23 and social or economic
associations not directly connected to either of those two funda-
mental constitutional rights.2 4
In the seminal case recognizing constitutional protection for
associational freedom, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,25
the United States Supreme Court erected a broad tent of consti-
tutional protection for associational activities. 26 In holding that
Alabama could not compel production of the NAACP's member-
ship lists, the Court defined the right of freedom of association
as "the right of the members [of the NAACP] to pursue their
The Supreme Court first articulated the implied right of association in Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. at 460. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that "[it is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 460.
21. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONsTITUIoNAL LAW
§ 20.41, at 200-01 (1986). These authors even go so far as to speculate that
"later case development may reveal a wide variety of other types or variations
of associational rights beyond these three categories." Id. at 200; see also TRmE,
supra note 20, § 12-26, at 1010 ("[A]ssociation in its communal sense-activity
understandable only as it exists in the context of group experience, as in a fam-
ily or commune, for example-has recently begun to find a place in first amend-
ment doctrine.") (footnote omitted). But ef Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (noting that "[olur decisions have referred to Con-
stitutionally protected 'freedom of association' in two distinct senses," intimate
association as a fundamental element of personal liberty and expressive associ-
ation as a fundamental element of other First Amendment liberties).
22. The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n individual's freedom to speak,
to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could
not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed."
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (holding that state law requiring admission of women
into the Jaycees has compelling interest sufficient to justify burden on freedom
of association).
23. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a state
law prohibiting interracial marriages in part because the statute violates the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. Smith v. Arkansas Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per
curiam) (implicitly recognizing the existence of constitutional protection for as-
sociations involving union activity); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609.
25. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The case involved an attempt by the State of Ala-
bama to compel production of NAACP membership lists. Id. at 451.
26. Id. at 460. The Court stated that "it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or
cultural matters," and that "[ejffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association." Id.
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lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with
others in so doing."27 Moreover, the Court held that state action
that curtails the freedom to associate merits the closest
scrutiny.
2 8
Since the 1958 NAACP case, the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed freedom of association claims in a wide variety of ar-
eas, establishing protections for the following associational
activities: loyalty oaths,29 political activity and patronage,3 0
union activities and organizing,31 membership in social,
cultural, and economic organizations,3 2  student organi-
27. Id. at 466. The Court explained that the state must establish an inter-
est sufficient to overcome the protected associational rights of the NAACP
members tojustify its court order compelling production of the lists. Id. at 463-
64. Thus, from the outset of freedom of association jurisprudence the Court has
approached the associational right by balancing the substantiality of the state's
interest against the nature of the associational right being asserted.
28. Id. at 460-61.
29. In Wieman v. Updegraff, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute
that required each state officer and employee, as a condition of employment, to
take a loyalty oath stating that the employee is not, and for the preceding five
years has not been, a member of a communist front or subversive organization.
344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court held that
mere membership in an organization, without specific intent to further unlaw-
ful aims of an organization, is not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclu-
sion from public employment. 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967).
30. In Elrod v. Burns, the Court stated that "[t]he threat of dismissal [from
public employment] for failure to provide [political support] unquestionably in-
hibits protected belief and association." 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976); see also
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding injunction prohibiting termi-
nation of public defenders based solely on their political beliefs).
31. In Smith v. Arkansas Highway Employees, the Court recognized that
union activity is within the protection of the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of association. 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979). See also Roberts v. Van Buren
Pub. Schs., 773 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing associational free-
doms implicated when state required the Jaycees to admit women as full mem-
bers); Professional Ass'n of College Educators v. El Paso County Community
College, 730 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir.) (holding that state interference with public
employees' union membership violated the employees' first amendment rights),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
32. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S 609 (1984), the Court
found that the right to freedom of association was "plainly implicated" where
the state used the Minnesota Human Rights Act to require the Jaycees to admit
women as full members "[iln view of the various protected activities in which
the Jaycees engages." Id. at 622. The Roberts Court held that the state's com-
pelling interest in eradicating discrimination justified the statute's impact on
the Jaycees' associational freedoms. Id. at 623; see also New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (not-
ing the strength of an associational right "varies with the nature of the
organization").
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zations,3 3 and family and personal relationships.34 Some lower
courts have extended the scope of protected activity even further
by protecting associational activity in the areas of dating and
cohabitation outside marriage.35
The scope of activities protected under the freedom of asso-
ciation guarantee continues to be a matter of legal and philo-
sophical debate. Some commentators argue that the recent
freedom of association cases limit protection to two areas: ex-
pressive association (connected to First Amendment speech
rights) and intimate association (connected to 14th Amendment
liberty and privacy rights).36 This "instrumental" approach3 7 is
33. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Court recognized that a
college's denial of recognition of a student group, without justification, bur-
dened the students' right to association protected by the Constitution. Id. at
181.
34. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down
a city housing regulation and extending constitutional protection to family rela-
tionships beyond the nuclear family); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(holding a Virginia statute banning interracial marriage "deprive[d] the Lov-
ings of liberty without due process of law .... The freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness.").
35. In Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (5th Cir. 1984), for exam-
ple, the plaintiff was fired from his job as a police officer for dating the daughter
of a convicted felon. The Fifth Circuit held that the freedom of association pro-
tected this purely personal association. Id. at 1544. The court stated that "the
first amendment freedom of association applies not only to situations where an
advancing of common beliefs occurs, but also to purely social and personal as-
sociations." Id. In the view of the Fifth Circuit, "[i]t is too late in the day to
doubt that this freedom of association extends only to political or conventional
associations and not to the social or unorthodox." Id. at 1543. The court further
stated that "[the concept of freedom of association has grown to include more
than associations which are for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs." Id.
See also McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 334-36 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that requirement that tenants in a public housing project register
overnight guests violated the tenants' rights to privacy and freedom of associa-
tion, and could only be justified by a showing that the means adopted were the
least restrictive in light of the governmental interests served) (citing NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960)); infra note 81 (explaining that it is best to think of associational rights
as proceeding on a continuum).
36. Mark Strauss, Public Employees'Freedom of Association: Should Con-
nick v. Myers' Speech-Based Public-Concern Rule Apply?, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV.
473, 476-82 (1992).
37. The term "instrumental approach" refers to the view that expressive
association should be constitutionally protected only where it is an "instru-
ment" employed by individuals to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment, such as speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and free exercise of religion. In contrast, the "intrinsic approach" refers to the
view that association of an intimate nature should receive constitutional protec-
tion as a fundamental element of personal liberty that is central to our Consti-
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closely linked to the theoretical view that the First Amendment
only protects the relationship between political speech and rep-
resentative democracy, the traditional rights under the First
Amendment.38 Other commentators argue that, based on the
liberty concepts of the Fourteenth Amendment and a broader in-
terpretation of the First Amendment, the constitutional guaran-
tee of freedom of association ought to be recognized as an
independent right that deserves greater consideration.39 These
commentators favor protecting associations that are distinct
from and reach beyond the traditional First Amendment con-
cern for politically-rooted associations.40 Supreme Court deci-
sions reflect both of these views.41
tutional scheme, and springs implicitly from both the Due Process clauses and
the Bill of Rights. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19
(1984); Strauss, supra note 36, at 481.
38. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 21, § 20.7, at 22 (citing ALEXANDER
fEKuLEJoUN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); AL-
EXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PoLTcAL FREEDOM (1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, What
Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 461 (1953)).
39. See Reena Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RIv. 1 (1977); Aviam Soifer, "Toward a Generalized Notion
of the Right to Form or Join an Association": An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 641, 669 (1988).
40. Raggi, supra note 39, at 14 ("Freedom of association as a principle
which is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, basic to our democratic soci-
ety, with roots deep in our history, should be recognized as an independent
right."). Under Raggi's formulation, whatever action a person can pursue as an
individual, freedom of association would protect when pursued in concert with
others. Id. See TRBE, supra note 20, § 12-2, at 788, § 12-26, at 1010-14 ("[It is
unclear how far the Court will carry its recently taken move in the opposite
direction-toward a system in which concerted effort itself is seen as entitled to
independent constitutional protection."). See also Soifer, supra note 39, at 669("[An independent right of freedom of association makes logical, historical, and
normative sense.").
In his famous observations on America, Alexis de Tocqueville said:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow-crea-
tures, and of acting in common with them. The right of association
therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right
of personal liberty.
DE TocQuEviLLE, supra note 1, at 98. It is instructive that de Tocqueville con-
nected association with "personal" liberty (a 14th Amendment and Due Process
Clause notion) and not simply "political" liberty (a First Amendment notion).
41. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18 (stating that "[ojur decisions have
referred to Constitutionally protected 'freedom of association' in two distinct
senses," expressive association and intimate association). Nevertheless, later
in his opinion, Justice Brennan explained that "we have long understood as
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of polit-
ical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Id. at 622.
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B. SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL RiGHTs OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
UNDER -PI AING AND CONWI-ICK
The Supreme Court only recently adopted the view that the
government may not constitutionally compel persons to relin-
quish their constitutional rights as a condition of public employ-
ment.42 Typically, the cases involving constitutional rights in
the public employment context arise where a public employer
restrains, conditions, or retaliates against a public employee's
speech or expression.43
1. The Pickering Balancing Test
The Supreme Court originally articulated a "balancing test"
for claims involving public employees' speech or associational
rights in Pickering v. Board of Education.44 In Pickering, a
school teacher affiliated with a teacher's organization wrote a
letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board's budget
policies. 45 The Pickering Court held that courts must balance
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argued that the proper approach to
associational freedom claims is "to distinguish nonexpressive from expressive
associations and to recognize that the former lack the full constitutional protec-
tions possessed by the latter." Id. at 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment).
42. In 1967, the Supreme Court said that "the theory that public employ-
ment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, re-
gardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (striking down a state law com-
pelling university employees to certify past or present status as a Communist).
See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting a lower
court decision requiring teachers to relinquish first amendment rights);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) ("It is sufficient to say that con-
stitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursu-
ant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.").
This is a reversal of the view prevailing during the first half of this century,
known as the "right-privilege distinction" and famously characterized by Jus-
tice Holmes, who said a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk poli-
tics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). For a good historical summary
of this development in the law, see Note, Developments in the Law: Public Em-
ployment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1738-49 (1984).
43. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563 (striking down the discharge of a
teacher who wrote a letter to the editor that was critical of local school board);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 497 (1960) (invalidating a state law requiring
public teachers to file an affidavit listing all the organizations to which they had
belonged within the last five years); Wieman, 344 U.S. at 183 (striking down a
state law compelling public employees to give a loyalty oath denying any past
affiliation with communists or subversive organizations).
44. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
45. Id. at 565-66. The school discharged him, alleging-that the letters in-
cluded false statements, damaged the reputation of administrators and school
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:425
the public employee's interest as a citizen in commenting upon
matters of public concern, against the state's interest as an em-
ployer concerned with the efficient delivery of public services. 46
The Court anchored this balancing analysis on the notion that
as an employer, the state may at times have more significant
reasons for regulating the speech of its employees than it has for
regulating the speech of citizens in general. 47
The Pickering Court recognized that the myriad of factual
possibilities that arise in the public employment context require
not a fixed standard by which to judge all speech, but rather
general guidelines for analyzing and balancing the competing
interests involved. 48 The Court's balancing analysis focused on
whether the statements impeded the teacher's performance of
his regular teaching duties or interfered with the operations of
the school generally.49 Accordingly, the Court analyzed whether
the school's interest in limiting the First Amendment rights of
its teachers was significantly greater than its interest in limit-
ing similar rights of any member of the general public.5 o In
short, the Pickering test provides that a government employer
board members, disrupted faculty discipline, and fomented controversy, con-
flict, and dissension among teachers, administrators, the Board, and the school
district residents. Id. at 566-67.
46. Id. at 568.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 569. Until Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983), there
was no threshold requirement that speech touch on a matter of public concern;
rather, the Pickering analysis considered, as one element in the balance, the
extent to which the speech involved matters of public concern. Pickering, 391
U.S. at 568.
Ironically, the general standard specifically avoided by the Court in Picker-
ing, id. at 569, is precisely what the Connick public concern test creates by im-
posing a threshold that speech must pass before any balancing analysis occurs.
See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (explaining the threshold require-
ment of the public concern test). In his Connick dissent, Justice Brennan ar-
gued that
Ithe proper means to ensure that the courts are not swamped with
routine employee grievances mischaracterized as First Amendment
cases is not to restrict artificially the concept of "public concern," but to
require that adequate weight be given to the public's important inter-
ests in the efficient performance of governmental functions.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73.
50. Id. at 573. Specifically, the Court noted that the teacher's criticism was
not aimed at persons with whom the plaintiff had daily contact, that the em-
ployment relationship was not one requiring personal loyalty and confidence for
proper functioning in the job, and that the statements were on issues of legiti-
mate public concern. Id. at 569-73. The Court concluded, after balancing the
competing interests, that "the interest of the school administration in limiting
teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater
434
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may not take disciplinary action or fire a public employee based
on the employee's speech unless an overriding state interest
supports the government action.51
2. The Connick Public Concern Requirement
In the 1983 case of Connick v. Myers,52 the Supreme Court
significantly restricted the scope of constitutional protection for
the speech rights of public employees.5 3 The Court in Connick
held that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal in-
terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the em-
ployee's behavior.5 4
Since Connick, discharge or other disciplinary actions by a gov-
ernment employer arising from speech or expression are not ac-
tionable unless the speech or expression touches on a matter of
public concern.55 Whether speech addresses a matter of public
than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the gen-
eral public." Id. at 573.
An example of the application of the Pickering balance to the dismissal of a
non-tenured teacher because of her union activities arose in Hickman v. Valley
Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 619 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1980). Although the precise
nature of the teacher's constitutional rights was not described, the court held
that "[s]chool administrators . . . cannot discharge teachers because of their
disapproval of the teachers' union activities. This much is clear, though the test
in Pickering v. Board of Educ. requires the court at times to weigh various fac-
tors in order to determine the scope of First Amendment protections." Id. at
610.
51. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Hickman, 619 F.2d at 610 (holding the firing of teacher consti-
tutionally impermissible where based on a personality conflict arising out of the
teacher's protected union activities).
52. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick involved a dispute between Harry Con-
nick, District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, and an Assistant District At-
torney on his staff, Sheila Myers. Id. at 140. Myers objected to Connick's
decision to transfer her to a different section of the District Attorney's office, so
she circulated a questionnaire about working conditions to other employees. Id.
at 140-41. Connick considered the distribution of the questionnaire to be an act
of insubordination, and fired Myers. Id. at 141. Myers alleged that the dis-
charge violated her First Amendment right of free speech. Id.
53. Connick is viewed as a departure from the trend in Supreme Court de-
cisions from the 1950s to the 1970s of moving toward granting public employees
all constitutional rights that are available to citizens in general. Developments
in the Law-Public Employment, supra note 42, at 1741, 1770.
54. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
55. See, e.g., Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 399
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding that teacher's statements in faculty newsletter intended
to organize opposition to administration were not of public concern and there-
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concern is determined by the content, form, and context of the
statement at issue.56
The Connick Court clearly intended to prevent public em-
ployees from turning virtually any remark made in the public
employment context, no matter what its effect or substance, into
a constitutional case when the remark precedes an unfavorable
employment decision.57 Connick thus endowed the government
with broad authority to act against public employees, while
stripping those employees of virtually all constitutional protec-
tion when their speech does not touch on a matter of public
concern.
58
C. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT-Is THE Co'.-wzci PUBLIC
CONCERN THRESHOLD AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN
ASSOCIATIONAL CLAiMs BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES?
The federal circuit courts are split over whether the Connick
public concern test applies to an employee's claim that a public
employer violated the employee's right to freedom of associa-
tion.59 Because the Supreme Court's recognition of associational
fore did not violate speech rights); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1512, 1516
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding no First Amendment claim stated where teacher's ver-
bal complaints about type of student registration and teaching assignments did
not relate to matters of public concern); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714,
715 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that failure to rehire teacher who filed a
union grievance did not violate First Amendment because grievance was not
speech on a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
56. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Although this is a broad and vague defini-
tion, the Connick Court seemed to apply it to mean at least that speech on mat-
ters relating to a personnel dispute, such as the transfer of Sheila Myers to
another section of the office, were not matters of public concern. Id. at 148.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in dis-
sent, criticized the meaning of "public concern" outlined by the majority opin-
ion. Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the public concern threshold
"impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which public employees may
speak out without fear of retaliatory dismissal").
57. Id. at 149. The Connick Court stated that "the First Amendment does
not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints
over internal office affairs," id., and that "government offices could not function
if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 146. In the majority opinion Justice White explained that
"[wihen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to [public
concern], government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their of-
fices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment." Id.
59. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the Connick public
concern test does not apply to cases in which employees allege only violation of
associational rights. See Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 993
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (superintendents association with school board members'
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freedoms is relatively recent,60 the federal courts have only a
developing and incomplete body of jurisprudence to guide their
decisions in these cases. 6 ' As a result, courts' discussion, rea-
opponents), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2275 (1992); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152,
1158 (5th Cir. 1991) (sheriff deputy's association with sheriff's political oppo-
nent); Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th
Cir. 1989) (principal's association with parents opposed to school closing). The
Eighth Circuit, without directly addressing the issue, has implicitly adopted the
same view. Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.
1986) (teacher's activity as a faculty union representative); Roberts v. Van
Buren Pub. Schs., 773 F.2d 949, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1985) (activities by a teacher
recruiting others to join a union). See also Schneider v. Indian River Commu-
nity College Found., Inc., 875 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987) (college radio
station employee fired for associating with another former employee who was
also fired); Conger v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 88-1584-C, 1990 WL 112940, at *5
(D. Kan. July 11, 1990) (stating "[tihe Connick query of whether the speech
touches upon a matter of public concern seems pointless in freedom of associa-
tion claims when the plaintiff alleges discrimination based on membership and
participation in the association alone and no 'speech' is involved"); Stellmaker
v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891 (D. Conn. 1989) (retaliation against teacher who
invoked union grievance procedures when transferred); Gavrilles v. O'Connor,
579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984) (public concern test not applied to plain-
tiff's claim that town officials retaliated against her for filing a union grievance;
plaintiff stated a valid associational right claim); Parker v. Cronvich, 567 F.
Supp. 1073 (E.D. La. 1983) (applying Connick test to First Amendment speech,
but not association claims, where deputies were allegedly fired for union
membership).
The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the public concern test
does apply to employees' claims involving only violations of associational rights.
See Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that statements in a faculty newsletter intended to organize teachers
to oppose administration are not protected associational activity); Griffin v.
Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1212-14 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding assistant principal's
filing of union grievance not protected from retaliation because the grievance is
not a matter of public concern); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 691-93 (6th Cir.
1985) (stating associational right not burdened when correctional officer de-
manding union representation given additional suspension). See also Marshall
v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding associational right impli-
cated because support of other employees alleging sex discrimination touches
on a matter of public concern); Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir.
1991) (per curiam) (holding employees alleging dismissal for union activities
adequately established that those activities touched on a matter of public con-
cern); Broderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 24-25 (D. Mass. 1991) (noting pub-
lic concern requirement applies to police union president's union activity);
Petrozza v. Village of Freeport, 602 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
firing of city plumber violated associational right because political association
at issue was a matter of public concern).
60. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-1, at 785, § 12-26, at 1010. See also supra
notes 19-41 and accompanying text (relating to the development of freedom of
association in constitutional jurisprudence).
61. TamBn, supra note 20, § 12-26, at 1014 ([Ilt is unclear how far the Court
will carry its recently taken move... toward a system in which concerted effort
itself is seen as entitled to independent constitutional protection.").
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soning, and analysis of the appropriate level of protection for
public employees' associational rights has been cursory and
limited.62
The courts holding that the Connick threshold test does ap-
ply to associational claims 63 rely on one or more of the following
three rationales for their holdings. First, these courts note that
even though Connick and Pickering involved speech claims, an
underlying issue in these cases was "whether government em-
ployees could be prevented or 'chilled' by the fear of discharge
from joining political parties or other associations that certain
public officials might find subversive."64 Next, these courts con-
tend that no logical reason exists to differentiate between speech
and association.65 Finally, they argue that one First Amend-
ment freedom should not be elevated above another,66 and,
therefore, associational rights should not be exempt from the
Connick test.
67
Adopting the view that Connick applies to associational
claims, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded,
for example, that the job reassignment of an assistant principal
in retaliation for his filing of a union grievance did not violate
his right of freedom of association as the filing was a matter of
62. Strauss, supra note 36, at 475 (characterizing the cases as holding or
assuming the Connick test does or does not apply "without discussion").
63. See supra note 59 (citing cases).
64. Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding assis-
tant principal's filing of union grievance not protected from retaliation because
the grievance is not a matter of public concern); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686,
692 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding freedom of association not infringed when correc-
tion officer demanding union representation given additional suspension be-
cause union representation not a matter of public concern) (quoting Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983)).
65. Boals, 775 F.2d at 692.
66. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) ("These First Amendment
rights are inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting greater consti-
tutional protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other
First Amendment expressions.") (citations omitted). McDonald involved a libel
claim by a prospective nominee to the post of U.S. Attorney against a citizen
who wrote a letter critical of the plaintiff to the President of the United States.
Id. at 480-81. It should be noted that the Court's pronouncement involved put-
ting two express constitutional protections of the First Amendment on equal
footing, whereas the associational right is an implicit protection that arises in
part out of the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra
notes 19-41 and accompanying text (describing the implied right of association).
Therefore, association, as an implicit and not express right arising from more
than one constitutional provision, arguably could receive different treatment by
courts.
67. Griffin, 929 F.2d at 1213.
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personal, not public concern. 68 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that where a correctional officer received two additional
days of suspension after demanding union representation at an
impromptu due process hearing for insubordination, the em-
ployee's right of freedom of association was not violated.69 The
court concluded the incident involved a matter of internal disci-
pline and was not a matter of public concern.70
The courts ruling that associational claims are exempt from
the Connick test 7 ' set forth two arguments. 72 First, they point
out that Connick involved only speech and did not raise associa-
tional claims. 73 Second, and perhaps more importantly, these
courts contend that they must respect the broad definition of
protected associational activity established by the Supreme
Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, and that Connick
should not infringe upon that broad protection.74
Adopting the view that associational claims are exempt
from Connick's requirements, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a
deputy sheriff's claim that he was discharged for his political
affiliation in violation of his right to freedom of association "is
not subject to the public concern requirement."75 Also adopting
this view, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a principal's right
to freedom of association was violated by a job demotion in retal-
iation for her association with parents who opposed a school
closing, and by the Board of Education's refusal to allow her to
bring others to a meeting with the superintendent related to her
job assignment. 76 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit did not apply the
public concern test when it concluded that nonrenewal of a
68. Id. at 1215.
69. Boals, 775 F.2d at 696.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 59 (citing cases).
72. For a slightly different analysis, see Strauss, supra note 36, at 485-86.
73. Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558
(11th Cir. 1987). Vivian Hatcher was a school principal who brought a § 1983
action after the school board demoted her in a school reorganization. Id. at
1548, 1557. She alleged the demotion was retaliation for her association with
parents protesting school closings at public meetings. Id.
74. Id. at 1558 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1958)). In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson the Court said that "it
is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain
to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters. ... [SItate action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the clos-
est scrutiny." 357 U.S. at 460-61.
75. Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1991).
76. Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1557-58 (remanded for a determination of
whether the associational conduct was a substantial factor in the job demotion).
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teacher's contract in retaliation for her activities as a union
faculty representative violated her First Amendment rights.77
Most significantly, no court addressing this issue ventures
beyond the reasoning described above to thoroughly examine the
differences between speech and association in the public employ-
ment context. As a result, there exists no persuasive foundation
for the settlement of this circuit court split in the cases decided
to date.
II. THE CONNICK TEST IS INAPT IN THE CONTEXT OF
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS
When analyzing claims involving associational rights of
public employees, courts should directly apply the Pickering bal-
ancing test, without first requiring that the plaintiff meet the
threshold public concern requirement that Connick established
for speech cases. Because the Supreme Court did not address
the differences between speech and association in either Con-
nick or Pickering, however, lower courts lack clear guidance as
to whether Connick applies to associational claims. Further-
more, lower court decisions in associational rights cases brought
by public employees are marked by a conspicuous lack of analy-
sis on this basic issue.78 A more thorough analysis of the differ-
ences between speech and association, and the proper degree of
protection courts should afford association in the public employ-
ment context, reveals that Connick is an inapt rule for cases in-
volving associational rights.
Important distinctions between speech and association
emerge when courts apply the Connick public concern test to al-
leged violations of a public employee's associational rights.
Three problems result from such an application. First, the Con-
nick test completely eliminates constitutional protection for the
non-public associations of public employees. Second, the defini-
tion of "public" association is vastly more difficult to determine
and is subject to much "easier" manipulation than is the deter-
mination of what is public speech. Third, non-public associa-
tional activities might become a basis for disciplining or
dismissing public employees even though the government has
not shown that the associational activities interfere with its le-
gitimate interests as an employer. As such, the lower courts'
failure to thoroughly analyze the differences in both constitu-
77. Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 785 F.2d 862, 866-67 (10th
Cir. 1986).
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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tional origin and fundamental nature between speech and asso-
ciation has left the law confused, and places the important
constitutional rights of public employees at risk in the circuits
that apply the Connick threshold to associational rights claims.
A. Co~rIIcI's PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION UNJUSTIFIABLY
ELIMINATES PROTECTION FOR NON-PUBLIC
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS
Although the Constitution protects both public and private
associations, 79 there should not be a bright line classification be-
tween the two. A bright line classification obscures the reality
that a range of activity exists that involves both public and pri-
vate aspects of association.80 Accordingly, the associational
right should protect a spectrum of associational activities.8 '
A wide variety of everyday social activities falls in the
mixed middle of this spectrum-between the public political ac-
tivity protected by the First Amendment, and the private inti-
mate activity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.8 2 A
common example is labor union activity.8 3 Union activity in-
cludes private economic matters such as negotiations over
wages, benefits, and working conditions, and public matters
such as group speeches and activities promoting the political in-
terests of union members.8 4 Another common example is social
organizations such as the Jaycees, Rotary clubs, or Planned
79. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting
that the opinion of the Court assumes, but does not hold, that there exists "a
constitutional right of private association for other than expressive or religious
purposes"); supra notes 31-32, 41. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960) (holding that "interference with personal freedom" of teachers by
compelling disclosure of associational ties violates the Constitution).
80. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). Justice
Brennan stated in Roberts, "[iln particular, when the State interferes with indi-
viduals' selection of those with whom they wish to [associate], freedom of associ-
ation in both of its forms may be implicated." Id.
81. See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 21, § 20.41, at 204 ("Perhaps it is best
to think of associational rights as proceeding on a continuum from the least
protected form of association in commercial activities to the most protected
forms of association to engage in political or religious speech or for highly per-
sonal reasons, such as family relationships.").
82. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
83. Union organizing and affiliation is a constitutionally protected activity
against which the state may not retaliate or discriminate. Smith v. Arkansas
Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per curiam).
84. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (protecting
the right not to associate with some of the public activities of a union, but up-
holding statutory dues requirements for collective bargaining activities).
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Parenthood.8 5 These organizations engage in various activities
involving economic, social, and cultural matters, in addition to
purely political matters.8 6 A third type of associational activity
falling in the middle of this spectrum involves personal relation-
ships outside the context of family and marriage, such as dating
and cohabitation.8 7 This broad spectrum of associational activ-
ity reveals a fundamental difference between speech and associ-
ation. The range of associational activity inherently invokes
both the personal freedoms protected by the privacy and liberty
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech, religion, petition, and assembly. Con-
stitutional protection of these activities does not spring from
only one or the other constitutional source of associational free-
dom. The mixed origin and nature of the freedom to engage in
these activities fundamentally distinguishes association from
pure speech or pure expression activities, whose protections
arise from the First Amendment's historical primary concern for
robust, free, and open political dialogue.88 Because this nar-
rower purpose for the freedom of speech guarantee forms the ba-
85. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. See also supra note 32 (describing
the Roberts holding). In Roberts, the Court noted that the right to freedom of
association was "plainly implicated" by a state statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender in public accommodations. 468 U.S. at 622. Even
though the statute's effect of compelling one to associate with another against
one's will violated the right of association, the Court upheld the violation be-
cause the statute furthered a compelling governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of ideas. Id. at 623.
86. Id. at 626-27.
87. For example, the Court in Roberts provided a high degree of constitu-
tional protection, arising from the liberty and privacy concepts of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, for "certain intimate human relationships" such as "creation and
sustenance of a family[,]... raising and education of children[,] ... and cohabi-
tation with one's relatives." Id. at 617-19 (citations omitted).
Some lower courts have extended this type of associational protection to
extramarital heterosexual cohabitation, Mindel v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970), and homosexual conduct, Norton v.
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489
F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See also Developments in the Law: Public Em-
ployment, supra note 42, at 1753-55. But see McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d
193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding University's decision to withdraw employ-
ment offer to homosexual after he applied for license to marry another man),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436
F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (upholding termination of public employ-
ees who were living together adulterously), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
88. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (describing
the First Amendment as a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
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sis for the Connick public concern test in speech-based claims,8 9
it is inapt when applied to associational activity.
The Connick threshold does not further its purpose when
applied to associational claims, thus creating harsh and unjusti-
fied results. The public concern threshold eliminates a public
employee's protection for the entire range of mixed public and
private associational activities not directly included within the
political expression protections of the First Amendment.90 Gen-
erally, the Constitution affords associational activities a degree
of protection that varies with the nature of the activity and the
government's interest in restricting or regulating the activity.91
The Constitution therefore, guarantees some degree of protec-
tion in associational choices, whether for purely public activity,
purely private activity, or some combination thereof.92 Though
these mixed associational activities are constitutionally pro-
tected for other citizens, public employees receive no protection
under the Connick public concern test.93 Until the courts justify
89. In Connick v. Myers, the Court explained that the threshold public con-
cern test was appropriate because the constitutional value being protected-
participation in "public affairs" in ways that "certain public officials might find
'subversive' "-is the kind of speech that "occupies the 'highest rung of the hier-
archy of First Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection." 461
U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983) (citations omitted).
90. See Strauss, supra note 36, at 488-89 (arguing that the public concern
test should be applied to expressive associations and not applied to intimate
associations such as marriage, but acknowledging that the exception only for
intimate associations would provide public employees with "scant protection for
their associations"). See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the public concern test "impermissibly narrows the class of sub-jects on which public employees may speak out"). The same impermissible nar-
rowing occurs when Connick is applied to employees' associational activity.
91. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("But our cases also recognize an 'association's First
Amendment right to control its membership,' acknowledging, of course, that the
strength of any such right varies with the nature of the organization.") (quoting
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984)).
92. "M[When the State interferes with individuals' selection of those with
whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association in both of
its forms [Fourteenth Amendment personal liberty and First Amendment ex-
pression] may be implicated." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
93. See, e.g., Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1991). Griffin was
an assistant school principal whose job performance ratings were reduced after
she missed more than two months of work due to work-related injuries. Id. at
1211. Through the union grihvance procedure, she prevailed in her effort to
have her "excellent" rating restored, but 24 hours later was demoted. Id. Her
suit alleging retaliation for her union affiliation was dismissed on summary
judgment because her association did not touch on a matter of public concern.
Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court, holding that Connick applies
to freedom of association. Id. at 1215. This effectively precluded any analysis of
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treating public employee association as the equivalent of speech,
such a result is arbitrary, harsh, and indefensible.
94
B. THE CIvNICK DEFINITION OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS
UNWORKABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSOCIATION
A second, more practical problem in applying the Connick
rule to associational claims arises when courts attempt to define
"public concern." Connick held that an examination of content,
form, and context will determine when speech touches on a mat-
ter of public concern.95 Although the Connick Court did not
completely clarify what distinguishes public from private
speech, the Court did state that speech concerning "internal of-
fice affairs" or "employee grievances" is not, considered public
speech, whereas speech on governmental affairs presumably is
considered public.96 This threshold serves to prevent two dis-
ruptions in the workplace: those created by the speech itself and
the defendant's alleged reason for the demotion, including whether it was in
retaliation for union affiliation, whether it was merely a pretext, and if not a
pretext, whether the reason for the dismissal was sufficient to justify the inva-
sion of Griffin's associational rights.
94. Connick arguably established a reasonable basis for distinguishing be-
tween public speech and non-public speech by resting its distinction on the
grounds that speech concerning mere personnel grievances resulting from man-
agement decisions is not the kind of speech protected by the First Amendment
in the public employment context. 461 U.S. at 148-49. Courts have not en-
gaged in similar reasoning when applying Connick to associational claims. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir., 1991) (holding Connick test
applicable to association claims as well as speech claims).
95. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. See supra text accompanying note 56.
Criticism of the "public concern" threshold has been substantial. Connick,
461 U.S. at 147. In his dissent to Connick, Justice Brennan voiced two con-
cerns: (1) that one factor, the context of the speech, is weighed twice, once in
the public concern test and then again in the Pickering balance; and, (2) that
the public concern test impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which
public employees may speak without fear of retaliation. Id. at 157-58 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
In addition, a number of authors have criticized Connick. See, e.g., Cynthia
KY. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public
Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1109, 1117-20 (1988) (arguing the Con-
nick test is overbroad and fails to constitutionally protect speech that does not
affect the governments managerial function); Stephen Allred, From Connick to
Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND.
L.J. 43 (1988) (arguing that Connick unfairly bfirdens the employee and that
courts have been "anything but consistent" in defining public speech); Paul Fer-
ris Solomon, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for a
Fresh Start, 55 U. CiN. L. Rav. 449 (1986) (criticizing Connick for failing "to
provide clear guidance" to lower courts).
96. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49.
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those perpetuated by judicial review of workplace disputes. 97
The application of this threshold to speech claims in the lower
courts, however, has been characterized as "anything but
consistent."98
Given the definition and purpose of the public concern test,
its application to associational claims leads to even greater con-
fusion. 99 Associational activity is by its nature an ongoing
course of action. In contrast, speech involves definitive state-
ments made during a controversial situation and often reducible
to a single set of facts. Speech cases, therefore, are more easily
measured by context, content, and form.100 The objectionable
speech at issue in Connick, for example, was the employee's
questionnaire circulated to other staff-a clearly definitive form
of speech. 1 1 By contrast, the objectionable association in Bod-
die was much less definitive because it involved a "close" friend-
ship with fellow employees who were also union officers, a
friendship that apparently extended throughout Boddie's
twelve-month probationary period.' 0 2
Individual associations, like Boddie's, are not static rela-
tionships. They evolve over time, often possessing different
characteristics of form, context, and content at different points
in the relationship.10 3 As a result, a court's analysis of associa-
97. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. See also Lee, supra note
95, at 1123 (discussing the two disruptions prevented by imposition of the
threshold requirement).
98. Allred, supra note 95, at 75. As a result, public employers and employ-
ees are "confused as to the scope of their free speech rights and responsibilities."
Id. Thus, even in speech cases, the public concern definition appears to be
defeating one of the tests purposes-to prevent disruption from judicial re-
view-because of the inconsistent and confusing application of the test in the
lower courts.
99. For an example of the confusion already resulting, compare Griffin v.
Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Connick to preclude an associ-
ational claim based on the filing of a union grievance because the grievance did
not touch on a matter of public concern), with Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 693(6th Cir. 1985) (applying Connick but finding that "an employee who is disci-
plined solely in retaliation for his membership in and support of a union states
a valid First Amendment claim").
100. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting the definition of "pub-
lic concern" provided by the Connick Court).
101. The Connick Court examined each of the 14 questions on the employee
questionnaire circulated by Sheila Myers and found only one touched on a mat-
ter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (the questionnaire itself is at-
tached to the opinion at 155).
102. Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 750-51.
103. For example, the testimony in Boddie showed that the plaintiff was "a
close friend" of the union officers, that he "hung out" with the union members,
and that he was supportive of union activities. Id. at 751.
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tional relationships in terms of their "public" or "private" charac-
ter is vastly more susceptible to the inconsistency and
manipulation 10 4 already evident in speech-based cases. 10 5 Such
manipulation, whether intentional or unintentional, will occur
whenever the court focuses on a private aspect as opposed to a
public aspect of the associational activity at issue.'0 6
Second, associational activity is one step further removed
than speech from conduct that threatens government effi-
ciency.' 07 As one commentator has noted, "[b]ecause expressive
conduct may be overt, noisy, and directly provocative, it can af-
fect the relationships between the employee and her supervi-
sors, co-workers, and employer to a much greater extent." 08
Association, by contrast, is less threatening because it is often
either simply a form of belief or, in other instances, not mani-
fested in workplace or work-related conduct. Association thus
provides less disruption of legitimate governmental objectives in
the workplace such as efficiency, and therefore deserves greater
protection than speech.' 0 9 Connick's public concern test, which
arose in speech cases, does not recognize this important distinc-
tion between speech and association, and thus insufficiently pro-
tects association"110
104. The facts of Boddie's association, for example, could easily be manipu-
lated by a court to achieve a finding either way on the public concern threshold.
In assessing whether Boddie's association was public or private, the court could
focus on the "friendship," or the fact that he "hung out" with union members, or
that he was supportive of union activities. Each might lead to a different result.
If the court focused on support for union activities it could emphasize either the
public political activities of unionism or the private economic activities. Again,
one leads to a different result than the other.
105. Allred, supra note 95, at 65. See also Toni M. Massaro, Significant
Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 31 (1987) (characterizing the problem as one of broad discretion given the
courts under the public concern test).
106. Even commentators who argue for applying Connick to associational
claims acknowledge the inconsistent results of Connick in speech cases.
Strauss, supra note 36, at 492-93.
107. Craig D. Singer, Conduct and Belief: Public Employee's First Amend-
ment Rights to Free Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CH. L. Ray. 897,
918 (1992).
108. Id. at 917.
109. Id.
110. The loyalty oath and patronage cases, in which the Court struck down
a number of state statutes requiring oaths denying affiliations with subversive
associations or pledging loyalty to political parties, exemplify this important
distinction. For example, the Court has stated that even a pledge of allegiance
to a political party "unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association"
even where 'those beliefs or associations have not been directly expressed.
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The distinction between speech and association is critical in
the public employment context because the Supreme Court is
constantly searching for ways to properly protect individual
rights while at the same time allowing the government to func-
tion efficiently."1 The Court in Connick chose to exclude non-
public speech from constitutional protection because it may di-
rectly threaten the government's efficient operation."12 In con-
trast, non-public association in this context generally does not
pose as immediate a threat to the smooth operation of govern-
mental functions."13 The Connick rule, therefore, should not ap-
ply to association.
For example, the fact that Boddie eats and socializes with a
union officer on his lunch break"14 is not nearly as disruptive of
office operations as the circulation by Myers of a questionnaire
to other employees on her lunch break.115 Because speech al-
ways involves conduct, speech in the workplace can be disrup-
tive, even if it is of a private character. Association, by contrast,
often manifests itself only in the form of belief or non-work-re-
lated conduct which, when not acted upon in a way to make the
association expressive conduct, is not typically disruptive of gov-
ernmental operations."16 In instances where association is dis-
ruptive of the legitimate governmental ends, the Pickering
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976). See also Singer, supra note 107, at
915-18 (discussing this distinction in light of Elrod).
111. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)
(rejecting the theory that public employment may be conditioned on a denial of
constitutional rights). Even the Connick majority recognized that "[o]ur re-
sponsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by
virtue of working for the government." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983). But see supra text accompanying note 51.
112. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text, and text accompanying
notes 95-96.
113. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (recognizing the less in-
trusive nature of associational activity).
114. See supra note 103 (discussing the range of association involved in
Boddie).
115. See supra note 52 (discussing the facts of Connick).
116. See, e.g., Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983)
(inquiry into the sex life of public employee seeking promotion to position of
police officer held to violate her privacy and associational interests), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp.
585, 588, 592 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that regulations permitting inquiry
into off-duty relationship of police officers exceeded scope of state's legitimate
interests and violated officer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and privacy), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909
(1985). See also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text, note 87.
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balancing test sufficiently protects the government's interests as
an employer." 7
C. LAWFUL ASSOCIATIONS DESERVE AT LEAST MINMAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The third problem with applying the Connick test to associ-
ational activity is that the reduced protection of public employ-
ees' associational rights arises arbitrarily from the Connick
public-private distinction. The courts fail to articulate any anal-
ysis and reasoning, as the Connick Court did for speech cases,118
to justify applying the public concern test to associational activ-
ity in the context of public employment." 9 Applying the public-
private distinction to association extends the Pickering principle
that the government has "interests... in regulating the speech
of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general" too far.120 In association cases, this amounts to a decla-
ration that citizens lose a potentially broad class of associational
rights121 upon accepting public employment, no matter the legit-
imacy of the government's interest and without explanation of
why private association should be so restrained for public
employees. 12 2
117. See Allred, supra note 95, at 77; see also infra note 133 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Pickering's balancing test).
118. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983).
119. As applied in Connick and other speech cases, the public concern test,
which generally eliminates constitutional protection for the private speech of
public employees, is grounded in the notion that private speech is categorically
not of sufficient constitutional importance to outweigh the government's inter-
est in efficient operations. Id. at 146-47. Regardless of the strength of this con-
clusion, the Supreme Court has failed to engage in similar analytical reasoning
with respect to associational activity.
120. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also supra
text accompanying notes 44-51.
121. See supra notes 26-35, 42-51 and accompanying text. See also Ro-
TUNDA ET AL., supra note 21, § 20.41.
122. The Connick public concern threshold in speech cases protects the gov-
ernmenfs interest in efficient delivery of services by not allowing every word
spoken in the public employment context to result in a potential First Amend-
ment claim. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49.
Arguably, this public-private distinction follows the Court's First Amend-
ment logic of providing speech on matters of public concern the highest degree
of constitutional protection, id. at 145 ("Speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to spe-
cial protection.") (citations omitted), while affording other forms of speech lesser
protection, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (government may regulate commercial speech if its asserted
interest is "substantial"), and some forms of speech no protection, Miller v. Call-
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Union activity, for example, receives constitutional protec-
tion as an associational activity without a direct basis in public
activity connected to First Amendment free speech.123 Implicit
in the Court's view of union activities is the notion that associa-
tional activities receive some constitutional protection, even if
they are not directly connected to a specific right articulated in
the First Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution, because
the Constitution protects associations of a mixed public-private
character. 12 4 To apply the public-private distinction of the pub-
lic concern test to associational claims effectively nullifies that
constitutional protection for public employees without justifying
the loss of rights with a compelling, substantial, or even legiti-
mate governmental interest.
Courts can achieve a better result by viewing the activities
that deserve constitutional protection broadly, and by recogniz-
ing that the degree of constitutional protection or scrutiny
should vary with the nature of the associational activity.
12 5
Family, religious, and political associations already possess a
high degree of protection because they connect directly to funda-
mental rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution in the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 126 Only a compelling gov-
ernmental interest not achievable by less intrusive means can
justify public employer interference with these rights in the
Pickering balance. 127 Other associational activities, such as
union affiliations, personal relationships, consumer activities,
commercial associations, or social club memberships, should be
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding obscene material unprotected by the First
Amendment).
123. Smith v. Arkansas Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per
curiam).
124. See supra notes 24, 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
125. "[T]he nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other as-
pect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case." Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). See also supra note 91.
126. See supra notes 22-23. See also Strauss, supra note 36, at 482-88, 495
(arguing that only a narrow realm of intimate associations protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment should be excepted from application of the Connick
test).
127. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (detailing the Coures
holding in Pickering). This gives associational activity of a public or intimate
nature the highest degree of constitutional protection, consistent with the
Court's general jurisprudence involving the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-23. It would also be consistent with the language of
Connick that "speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierar-
chy of First Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection." 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983) (citations omitted).
19941 449
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:425
entitled to a lower degree of protection, because the freedoms
protecting these associations only arise indirectly by blending
the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' 1s As a result, a standard lower than the compelling in-
terest standard provides these activities sufficient protection
from governmental interference. 29 The Supreme Court has yet
to articulate clearly the degree of protection that this lesser
standard should provide.130
III. ACHIEVING A BETTER RESULT: DIRECT
APPLICATION OF THE PICKERING
BALANCING TEST
Rather than apply the Connick threshold public concern
test to associational activity of public employees, courts should
exclusively focus on the Pickering balancing test.1 1 The Picker-
ing framework preserves the Supreme Court's originally broad
view of the right of freedom of association 132 while protecting
the government's ability as an employer to deliver public serv-
ices efficiently.' 33
128. Supra notes 76-87, 125 and accompanying text.
129. "[Tlhe Constitution does not guarantee a right to public employment
[but it does not follow that] a city or a State may resort to any scheme for keep-
ing people out of such employment." Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716, 725 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added).
This conclusion would be consistent with the Court's categorical approach
to protection of speech. The Court's doctrine relating to state regulation of
speech provides that the "Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to com-
mercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)
(citation omitted). See also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment) ("The proper approach to analysis of First Amend-
ment claims of associational freedom is, therefore, to distinguish nonexpressive
from expressive associations and to recognize that the former lack the full con-
stitutional protections possessed by the latter.").
130. Rotunda et al. suggest that the Court's standard is that "[slo long as
the [state] is rationally promoting an arguably legitimate government goal by
restricting the activities of a business association" the Court will not invalidate
the state action. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 21, § 20.41.
See infra note 142 for Justice O'Connor's more complete explanation of
what the proper degree of protection should be.
131. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
133. The Pickering balancing test would achieve this precisely because it is
a balancing test-"it is neutral on its face." Developments in the Law: Public
Employment, supra note 42, at 1748. Even though Pickering did expand the
protections for public employees, it has been overall pro-employer. Application
of the Pickering balancing test
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Had the Boddie court applied the Connick threshold test by
first asking whether Boddie's associational interest addressed a
matter of public concern, as Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit
precedent require,'34 it most likely would have found that Bod-
die's relationship with the local union officers was related solely
to matters of personal interest.' 35 Thus, application of the Con-
nick threshold requirement to Boddie's case would have pre-
cluded Boddie's claim under section 1983.136 Consequently,
Boddie would have been denied freedom of association merely
because he was a public employee, even though no counter-
vailing governmental interest existed. In effect, Boddie would
have the status of a 19th-century public employee-forced to
give up constitutional rights to accept or maintain his public
employment.' 3 7
Under the Pickering balancing approach, in contrast, courts
would first examine the associational activity-whether polit-
ical, economic, social, cultural, religious, or intimate' 3S-to de-
termine what level of protection it deserves.' 39 Courts would
then balance the employee's right to pursue those lawful inter-
ests in association with others 40 against the government's in-
terests in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
has inadequately protected public employees' right to free speech.
Although courts have fully articulated and usually deferred to employ-
ers' interests in efficiency, they have neglected to explicate employees'
interests in expression. This systematic bias has resulted in a body of
law that too narrowly conceives public employees' first amendment
freedoms.
Id. at 1757.
134. See supra note 59 (citing cases).
135. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
assistant principal's filing of union grievance not a matter of public concern).
136. Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745,747 (5th Cir. 1993) (acknowl-
edging "the force" of the city's argument that Connick barred Boddie's claim).
See also supra note 15 (demonstrating that the Fifth Circuit felt constrained by
precedent to not apply Connick).
137. See supra note 42.
138. Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
139. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). The Court in Connick ex-
plained that the Pickering balance "unmistakably states" that the State's bur-
den in justifying a particular discharge "varies depending upon the nature of
the employee's expression." Id. Therefore, applying the balancing test to asso-
ciational rights would first entail an assessment of the nature of the employee's
association.
This is the same basic approach that Justice O'Connor argued for in her
concurrence in Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 468 U.S. 609, 631-38 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). One commentator has characterized her opinion as
"the most persuasive opinion in the.., case, perhaps the most cogent of all the
recent freedom of association opinions." Soifer, supra note 39, at 655.
140. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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provides through its employees. 141 If the Fifth Circuit in Boddie
would have taken this approach, for example, the court might
have determined that union activity merits an intermediate de-
gree of constitutional protection and required a substantial gov-
ernmental interest to justify discharges founded upon such
associations.142
If the Boddie defendants had asserted that the union activ-
ity itself was the basis of the dismissal (making the defense no
longer pretextual), however, the Pickering balance would not
preclude the court from finding that the government's action fur-
thers a substantial governmental interest sufficient to justify af-
fording public employees less constitutional protection for union
activity than citizens in general. 143 The critical difference be-
tween the two approaches is that reaching this result under the
seemingly simple balancing test forces the court to make the
"hard choices inherent in" the Pickering approach. 144 Doing so
requires the court to examine the interests of the employer in
discouraging union associational activity and weigh those inter-
ests against an individual's constitutionally protected right to
associate with a union. Only this balancing process guarantees
a fair degree of protection for Boddie's associational rights. 145
141. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick, 461
U.S. at 150-51 ("The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the govern-
ment's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to
the public.").
142. In Vicksburg Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Vicksburg, the Fifth Circuit
held that a governmental intrusion on the right to associate in the context of
union activity will withstand scrutiny if the regulation serves a legitimate and
substantial governmental interest and the means employed are the least dras-
tic restriction of constitutional rights. 761 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960)).
This is consistent with Justice O'Connor's statements in her concurring
opinion in Roberts that regulation of commercial associations in the nature of
recruiting customers, new members, or employees will be upheld if rationally
related to a legitimate governmental end, but that state regulation of an organi-
zation's relations with its members or with the state can pass constitutional
muster "only if the regulation is 'narrowly drawn' to serve a 'sufficiently strong,
subordinating interest' without unnecessarily interfering with First Amend-
ment freedoms." 468 U.S. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
143. See supra text accompanying note 47.
144. Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
145. It would be wrong to conclude that the Pickering balancing test, with-
out a Connick threshold, always tips the scales in favor of public employees. In
a 1985 case, the Fifth Circuit held, without applying the Connick public concern




Applying the Pickering balancing test to public employee
freedom of association claims directly, and without the Connick
public concern threshold test, achieves an optimum result be-
cause it protects a broad range of associational activities without
hindering the government's legitimate interests as an employer.
Of equal importance, the Pickering approach restores the princi-
ple underlying the Supreme Court's elimination of the right-
privilege distinction with respect to public employees:
"[C]onstitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion ... is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
146
In addition, it forces courts to move forward in defining the con-
tours and extent of the constitutional protection guaranteed by
the right to freedom of association. A straightforward applica-
tion of the Pickering test would preclude courts from dismissing
associational rights cases for failing to meet the Connick public
concern requirement, and would force courts to confront the
more difficult choices that arise when public employees assert
associational rights.' 47
The public employment context is an advantageous avenue
for the courts to begin this next step in defining associational
rights. It affords an opportunity for the courts to advance and
refine our conception of associational rights and their degree of
relative constitutional protection, while also allowing the courts
to circumscribe those rights for public employees when the gov-
ernment can assert a sufficient countervailing interest. In doing
so, vigilant courts can prevent a mere city fire chief from becom-
ing, in the words of de Tocqueville, "an arbitrary prince."' 48
the firefighters' union served a "legitimate and substantial government inter-
est" in providing efficient and dependable firefighting services. Vicksburg, 761
F.2d at 1040. Thus, even though the associational right at issue was of a pri-
vate nature, the Pickering balance protected the legitimate interests of the gov-
ernment as an employer. Id.
146. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
147. Eiland, 797 F.2d at 957 (noting the "hard choices inherent in the Pick-
ering equation").
148. DE TocQuEvLLE, supra note 1, at 98.
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